The package pool was committed but the installer still stopped at "no local
package repository": it requires the compiled bundle (Packages, Packages.gz,
packages.lock.tsv, SHA256SUMS), and building that had never run.
The bundle
- 1321 packages, 884 MiB, Ubuntu 26.04 amd64, built with apt-ftparchive on the
fleet's own release so the closure matches the devices.
- built/pool/ is gitignored: those .deb files are already tracked once under
provisioning/offline-repo/packages/, and the same ~890 MB does not need a
second path. What the installer reads from the bundle is the index.
- The output directory is chmod 0755: mktemp -d created it 0700 and left it
so, which made a valid bundle unreadable to the installer's probe.
dpkg-deb output was parsed wrong in four places
- `dpkg-deb -f <file> Package Version` prints "<Field>: <value>", and the
callers kept the whole line, so the value carried its label. build-index.sh
therefore accepted no package at all and reported an empty pool;
add-packages.sh rejected every real .deb as an invalid name, missed version
conflicts, and copied a duplicate; build-offline-repo.sh never matched a pin.
- The test suite could not see any of this: its dpkg-deb stub emitted bare
values. The stub now prints the labels exactly as the real tool does, which
is what surfaced the remaining three sites.
Tests
- The secret scan covers the files we author, not apt-ftparchive's index over
third-party packages: polkit's own description reads "...asked for their
password:", which is prose in the packages, not a leak. Any secret reaching a
manifest, README or tool is still caught.
- The "test build must not touch the bundle" assertion now compares the
directory before and after instead of demanding it be empty, so a
maintainer's real build is not reported as test spill.
The operator no longer answers an "offline?" question and no longer needs
network access: the installer finds the package set that ships with the
checkout, so the only input left is the dealer number.
Installer
- Auto-discover the local APT repository (BF_OFFLINE_REPO, then
provisioning/offline-repo/built, then /opt/blueforce/offline-repo) and
enter offline mode on its own; --offline stays for compatibility.
- Fail closed with an explicit Turkish message when nothing is found: the
searched locations, what to do, and a named exit reason -- no state touched.
- Distinguish "repository absent" (operator error, actionable) from
"repository present but invalid" (OFFLINE BLOCKED, verification gate).
- Network is informational only in precheck/network modules; no probe runs in
offline mode and archive.ubuntu.com is no longer mandatory.
ISO builder
- Look for built/ first, which is what build-index.sh produces, and accept
build/ as a warned legacy path. The two disagreed, so a medium could be
built without the package set and fail only at install time.
Docs
- docs/27, scripts/install/README, provisioning/offline-repo/README and
provisioning/firstboot/README describe the discovered flow, the two failure
modes, and that the installer downloads nothing.
Tests
- check-admin-static exercised the "console missing from the clone" branch by
deleting a tracked file; git clone restored it from history, so the branch
never ran and the warning was effectively untested. Build the stripped
source as a real commit instead; verified by mutation.
Adds the Blueforce Field OS provisioning stack on top of the existing fleet
architecture, without rewriting the working systems (installer, diagnostics,
Ansible, WireGuard/SSH/xRDP/RustDesk, Docker policies, monitoring, Docusaurus).
ISO build (the previous builder was a skeleton that produced no medium):
- boot layout is read from the base ISO at build time via
`xorriso -report_el_torito as_mkisofs` and rebuilt with `-as mkisofs`;
`-boot_image any replay` cannot work on Ubuntu live ISOs because the GRUB2
MBR lives in the source image's first 16 sectors and the EFI system partition
is an appended partition, neither of which is a file in the ISO9660 tree
- preflight now asserts El Torito boot metadata positively: xorriso exits 0 on
a non-ISO input, which previously let an arbitrary file pass --check
- artifact produced and verified: dist/Blueforce-Field-OS-1.0.0-amd64.iso,
6 481 917 952 bytes, SHA256 cb0cc56f...d431296, BIOS+UEFI entries preserved,
/autoinstall.yaml at the media root, casper/minimal.squashfs byte-identical
to the base
- recorded baseline deviation: the verified medium on the build host is the
Desktop flavour, so the manifest carries a baseline_deviation block instead
of hiding it; Server remains one flag away
Offline and identity:
- offline APT contract with concrete package requirements, pin format and an
audit table; builds fail closed while pins are UNPINNED
- autoinstall keeps interactive-sections: [storage]: the operator confirms the
target disk, and no automatic wipe is ever performed
- firstboot terminal wizard for the 8-digit dealer id, three-state lifecycle
(PROVISIONED_OFFLINE -> ENROLLED -> READY) with fail-closed gates, so a
missing internet link or WireGuard handshake cannot fail provisioning but can
never produce a false READY
Fleet and migration:
- five read-only Ansible playbooks for Field OS version, provisioning,
enrollment, remote channels and offline readiness, all wave-scoped with a
separate production override
- Windows pre-migration inventory and data export extended to the full brief
scope, read-only, never collecting credentials
Tests: tests/run-all.sh -> 8/8 pass, exit 0. Boot acceptance (UEFI, Legacy
BIOS, Secure Boot), air-gapped install, real enrollment endpoint and Windows
rollback remain LAB work and are listed in IMPLEMENTATION-REPORT.md.
