The guide claimed four secondary tools (environment info, live hardware check,
remote-access status, hardware inventory) exist only in the terminal console.
Measured against the loaded catalogue, all of them are reachable from the GUI's
Detaylı mod tabs -- the Araçlar tab lists 9 operations and Cihaz bilgisi carries
the info screens -- and the TUI uses the same bfos.operations catalogue, so
neither surface holds anything the other lacks. `--tui` is a fallback for a
missing window, not a place where missing features live.
The package pool was committed but the installer still stopped at "no local
package repository": it requires the compiled bundle (Packages, Packages.gz,
packages.lock.tsv, SHA256SUMS), and building that had never run.
The bundle
- 1321 packages, 884 MiB, Ubuntu 26.04 amd64, built with apt-ftparchive on the
fleet's own release so the closure matches the devices.
- built/pool/ is gitignored: those .deb files are already tracked once under
provisioning/offline-repo/packages/, and the same ~890 MB does not need a
second path. What the installer reads from the bundle is the index.
- The output directory is chmod 0755: mktemp -d created it 0700 and left it
so, which made a valid bundle unreadable to the installer's probe.
dpkg-deb output was parsed wrong in four places
- `dpkg-deb -f <file> Package Version` prints "<Field>: <value>", and the
callers kept the whole line, so the value carried its label. build-index.sh
therefore accepted no package at all and reported an empty pool;
add-packages.sh rejected every real .deb as an invalid name, missed version
conflicts, and copied a duplicate; build-offline-repo.sh never matched a pin.
- The test suite could not see any of this: its dpkg-deb stub emitted bare
values. The stub now prints the labels exactly as the real tool does, which
is what surfaced the remaining three sites.
Tests
- The secret scan covers the files we author, not apt-ftparchive's index over
third-party packages: polkit's own description reads "...asked for their
password:", which is prose in the packages, not a leak. Any secret reaching a
manifest, README or tool is still caught.
- The "test build must not touch the bundle" assertion now compares the
directory before and after instead of demanding it be empty, so a
maintainer's real build is not reported as test spill.
Simplifies the primary path from "build a custom ISO" to "install from git and
run one menu", which is what the operator actually asked for. The ISO tooling
stays in the tree as a secondary/optional route and is not removed.
admin/bf-bootstrap.sh -- one command on Ubuntu:
- clones the repo to /opt/blueforce-linux or fast-forwards an existing checkout
(a dirty tree is reported and skipped, never reset or stashed)
- installs git/curl/ansible-core, links admin/bf-* and scripts/*/bf-* into
/usr/local/bin, and finishes with the exact next command
- --check is read-only, works without root, and mutates nothing; the piped form
(curl ... | sudo -S -p '' bash) is guarded against eating the script
admin/bf-menu -- numbered operator console (categories 1-5):
- 1 installs THIS device locally; 2 and 5 drive the fleet through the existing
21 Ansible playbooks; 3 prepares and verifies central integration without
installing a central server; 4 holds local tools
- every operation picks one target: a dealer number or an approved wave group.
Scope is derived from the playbook file itself, so a playbook whose declared
scope disagrees with the console's table is refused rather than run
- the command is always shown before it runs; release-gated operations require
a typed wave token, production requires a second token, and "all" runs
wave-by-wave, stopping at the first failure
- audit log at /var/log/blueforce-console.log (mode 600, falls back to
$XDG_STATE_HOME when not writable), recording sanitized target/command/exit
only: no playbook output, no secrets
admin/bf-creds -- optional credential record, DEFAULT OFF:
- a bare run generates nothing and reports what already exists (device id,
WireGuard public key, private key path only, RustDesk id)
- --generate writes /root/blueforce-credentials.txt (0600) and --fetch delivers
it to admin/secrets/<dealer>.txt (0700/0600, git-ignored). The secret never
reaches stdout, stderr or argv
- this does not change the SSH design: password auth stays off and the
blueforce account stays locked, per docs/06. It is a local delivery aid only
docs/33-OPERATOR-CONSOLE.md -- step-by-step guide for an operator new to Linux
and DevOps: which command to type where, what the screen will ask, both
end-to-end sample sessions, the five most common errors, and the security rules.
Tests: run-all.sh -> 9/9 pass, exit 0 (adds check-admin-static.sh, 159 checks,
with negative controls and mutation-proven non-vacuity).
