Adds the Blueforce Field OS provisioning stack on top of the existing fleet architecture, without rewriting the working systems (installer, diagnostics, Ansible, WireGuard/SSH/xRDP/RustDesk, Docker policies, monitoring, Docusaurus). ISO build (the previous builder was a skeleton that produced no medium): - boot layout is read from the base ISO at build time via `xorriso -report_el_torito as_mkisofs` and rebuilt with `-as mkisofs`; `-boot_image any replay` cannot work on Ubuntu live ISOs because the GRUB2 MBR lives in the source image's first 16 sectors and the EFI system partition is an appended partition, neither of which is a file in the ISO9660 tree - preflight now asserts El Torito boot metadata positively: xorriso exits 0 on a non-ISO input, which previously let an arbitrary file pass --check - artifact produced and verified: dist/Blueforce-Field-OS-1.0.0-amd64.iso, 6 481 917 952 bytes, SHA256 cb0cc56f...d431296, BIOS+UEFI entries preserved, /autoinstall.yaml at the media root, casper/minimal.squashfs byte-identical to the base - recorded baseline deviation: the verified medium on the build host is the Desktop flavour, so the manifest carries a baseline_deviation block instead of hiding it; Server remains one flag away Offline and identity: - offline APT contract with concrete package requirements, pin format and an audit table; builds fail closed while pins are UNPINNED - autoinstall keeps interactive-sections: [storage]: the operator confirms the target disk, and no automatic wipe is ever performed - firstboot terminal wizard for the 8-digit dealer id, three-state lifecycle (PROVISIONED_OFFLINE -> ENROLLED -> READY) with fail-closed gates, so a missing internet link or WireGuard handshake cannot fail provisioning but can never produce a false READY Fleet and migration: - five read-only Ansible playbooks for Field OS version, provisioning, enrollment, remote channels and offline readiness, all wave-scoped with a separate production override - Windows pre-migration inventory and data export extended to the full brief scope, read-only, never collecting credentials Tests: tests/run-all.sh -> 8/8 pass, exit 0. Boot acceptance (UEFI, Legacy BIOS, Secure Boot), air-gapped install, real enrollment endpoint and Windows rollback remain LAB work and are listed in IMPLEMENTATION-REPORT.md.
145 lines
5.3 KiB
Bash
Executable file
145 lines
5.3 KiB
Bash
Executable file
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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#
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# bf-check-local - PROVISIONED_OFFLINE level gate (local proof only).
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#
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# This gate must PASS on a device that has never reached the internet:
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# * it performs no DNS, HTTP or central call at all,
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# * a missing wg0.conf or a missing WireGuard handshake is reported as WARN
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# because enrollment has not happened yet - it is never a failure here,
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# * WireGuard handshake freshness belongs to bf-check-enrollment (ENROLLED)
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# and bf-check-ready (READY) only.
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#
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# Usage: bf-check-local [--check] [--help]
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# --check accepted for symmetry with the installer modules; checks never
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# mutate anything, so --check and the default are identical.
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#
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# Exit status: 0 every local gate passed, 1 at least one gate failed.
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# Never prints secrets.
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#
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set -euo pipefail
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STATE_FILE="${BF_STATE_FILE:-${STATE_DIR:-/var/lib/blueforce}/state.json}"
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WG_DIR="${WG_DIR:-/etc/wireguard}"
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SELF_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
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fails=0
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pass() { printf 'PASS: %s\n' "$1"; }
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fail() { printf 'FAIL: %s\n' "$1"; fails=$((fails + 1)); }
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warn() { printf 'WARN: %s\n' "$1"; }
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info() { printf 'INFO: %s\n' "$1"; }
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usage() {
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cat <<'EOF'
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Usage: bf-check-local [--check]
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Verify the local, pre-enrollment (PROVISIONED_OFFLINE) gates:
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* lifecycle state file present and contract-valid,
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* WireGuard device keypair present, root-only and self-consistent,
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* xrdp and xrdp-sesman enabled and active,
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* default systemd target is multi-user.target.
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No internet, no WireGuard handshake and no central evidence is required.
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Exit status: 0 all gates pass, 1 at least one gate failed.
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EOF
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}
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while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
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case "$1" in
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--check) shift ;;
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--help|-h) usage; exit 0 ;;
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*) echo "ERROR: unknown argument: $1" >&2; usage >&2; exit 2 ;;
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esac
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done
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mode_bits() { stat -c '%a' "$1" 2>/dev/null || printf ''; }
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# True when a file is readable/writable beyond its owner.
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wide_mode() {
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local mode
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mode="$(mode_bits "$1")"
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[[ -n "$mode" ]] || return 1
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((8#$mode & 8#077))
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}
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info 'local-only gate: no internet, no WireGuard handshake and no central evidence is required'
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# 1. Lifecycle state contract. bf-enrollment-status owns the validation rules.
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if "$SELF_DIR/bf-enrollment-status" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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pass 'lifecycle state file present and contract-valid'
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else
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fail 'lifecycle state file missing or contract-invalid (run bf-enrollment-status)'
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fi
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phase="$("$SELF_DIR/bf-enrollment-status" --field phase 2>/dev/null)" || phase=''
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if [[ "$phase" =~ ^(PROVISIONED_OFFLINE|ENROLLED|READY)$ ]]; then
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pass "lifecycle phase is $phase"
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else
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fail 'lifecycle phase is missing or invalid'
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fi
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if [[ -r "$STATE_FILE" ]]; then
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pass "state file readable: $STATE_FILE"
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else
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fail "state file not readable: $STATE_FILE"
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fi
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if wide_mode "$STATE_FILE"; then
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warn "state file mode is $(mode_bits "$STATE_FILE"); the contract requires 0600"
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fi
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# 2. WireGuard device identity. The private key is a device-only secret: it must
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# exist, be unreadable by group/other, and belong to the public key that
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# enrollment publishes.
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if [[ -s "$WG_DIR/privatekey" ]]; then
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pass 'WireGuard private key present'
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else
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fail "WireGuard private key missing or empty: $WG_DIR/privatekey"
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fi
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if [[ -e "$WG_DIR/privatekey" ]]; then
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if wide_mode "$WG_DIR/privatekey"; then
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fail "WireGuard private key mode is $(mode_bits "$WG_DIR/privatekey"); it must be root-only (0600)"
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else
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pass 'WireGuard private key is root-only'
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fi
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fi
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if [[ -s "$WG_DIR/publickey" ]]; then
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pass 'WireGuard public key present'
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else
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fail "WireGuard public key missing or empty: $WG_DIR/publickey"
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fi
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if command -v wg >/dev/null 2>&1 && [[ -s "$WG_DIR/privatekey" && -s "$WG_DIR/publickey" ]]; then
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derived="$(wg pubkey < "$WG_DIR/privatekey" 2>/dev/null | tr -d '[:space:]')" || derived=''
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if [[ -n "$derived" && "$derived" == "$(tr -d '[:space:]' < "$WG_DIR/publickey")" ]]; then
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pass 'WireGuard keypair is self-consistent'
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else
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fail 'WireGuard public key does not match the local private key'
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fi
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else
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warn 'wg tool unavailable: keypair consistency not verified'
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fi
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# 3. Local access services (the field technician path must work offline).
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if systemctl is-enabled --quiet xrdp 2>/dev/null && systemctl is-active --quiet xrdp 2>/dev/null; then
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pass 'xrdp enabled and active'
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else
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fail 'xrdp is not enabled and active'
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fi
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if systemctl is-enabled --quiet xrdp-sesman 2>/dev/null && systemctl is-active --quiet xrdp-sesman 2>/dev/null; then
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pass 'xrdp-sesman enabled and active'
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else
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fail 'xrdp-sesman is not enabled and active'
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fi
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if [[ "$(systemctl get-default 2>/dev/null)" == 'multi-user.target' ]]; then
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pass 'default target is multi-user.target'
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else
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fail "default target is $(systemctl get-default 2>/dev/null || echo unknown), expected multi-user.target"
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fi
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# 4. Post-enrollment artifacts are explicitly out of scope here.
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if [[ -e "$WG_DIR/wg0.conf" ]]; then
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info 'wg0.conf present (enrollment already ran); handshake belongs to bf-check-enrollment'
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else
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warn 'wg0.conf absent: not enrolled yet, which is expected before enrollment'
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fi
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if [[ "$fails" -ne 0 ]]; then
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printf 'bf-check-local: FAILED (%s local gate(s))\n' "$fails"
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exit 1
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fi
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printf 'bf-check-local: local gates PASS (offline-safe, no central evidence required)\n'
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