Adds the Blueforce Field OS provisioning stack on top of the existing fleet architecture, without rewriting the working systems (installer, diagnostics, Ansible, WireGuard/SSH/xRDP/RustDesk, Docker policies, monitoring, Docusaurus). ISO build (the previous builder was a skeleton that produced no medium): - boot layout is read from the base ISO at build time via `xorriso -report_el_torito as_mkisofs` and rebuilt with `-as mkisofs`; `-boot_image any replay` cannot work on Ubuntu live ISOs because the GRUB2 MBR lives in the source image's first 16 sectors and the EFI system partition is an appended partition, neither of which is a file in the ISO9660 tree - preflight now asserts El Torito boot metadata positively: xorriso exits 0 on a non-ISO input, which previously let an arbitrary file pass --check - artifact produced and verified: dist/Blueforce-Field-OS-1.0.0-amd64.iso, 6 481 917 952 bytes, SHA256 cb0cc56f...d431296, BIOS+UEFI entries preserved, /autoinstall.yaml at the media root, casper/minimal.squashfs byte-identical to the base - recorded baseline deviation: the verified medium on the build host is the Desktop flavour, so the manifest carries a baseline_deviation block instead of hiding it; Server remains one flag away Offline and identity: - offline APT contract with concrete package requirements, pin format and an audit table; builds fail closed while pins are UNPINNED - autoinstall keeps interactive-sections: [storage]: the operator confirms the target disk, and no automatic wipe is ever performed - firstboot terminal wizard for the 8-digit dealer id, three-state lifecycle (PROVISIONED_OFFLINE -> ENROLLED -> READY) with fail-closed gates, so a missing internet link or WireGuard handshake cannot fail provisioning but can never produce a false READY Fleet and migration: - five read-only Ansible playbooks for Field OS version, provisioning, enrollment, remote channels and offline readiness, all wave-scoped with a separate production override - Windows pre-migration inventory and data export extended to the full brief scope, read-only, never collecting credentials Tests: tests/run-all.sh -> 8/8 pass, exit 0. Boot acceptance (UEFI, Legacy BIOS, Secure Boot), air-gapped install, real enrollment endpoint and Windows rollback remain LAB work and are listed in IMPLEMENTATION-REPORT.md.
72 lines
3 KiB
Bash
Executable file
72 lines
3 KiB
Bash
Executable file
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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# MEG placeholder: install vendor .deb if present, else SKIP + acceptance checklist.
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# Idempotent: safe to re-run. Supports --check for read-only verification.
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# Exit codes: 0 = OK, 3 = SKIP (optional step, nothing to do).
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set -euo pipefail
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MODULE="11-meg"
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LOG_FILE="${LOG_FILE:-/var/log/blueforce-install.log}"
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DEALER_ID="${DEALER_ID:-}"
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BF_HOSTNAME="${BF_HOSTNAME:-}"
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BF_DEVICE="${BF_DEVICE:-}"
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STATE_DIR="${STATE_DIR:-/var/lib/blueforce}"
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log() {
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local msg="$1"
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mkdir -p "$(dirname "$LOG_FILE")" 2>/dev/null || true
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echo "$(date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ) [11-meg] $msg" | tee -a "$LOG_FILE"
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}
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CHECK_MODE=0
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if [[ "${1:-}" == "--check" ]]; then CHECK_MODE=1; fi
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MEG_DEB="${MEG_DEB:-$(ls /opt/blueforce/debs/meg*.deb /opt/blueforce/meg*.deb 2>/dev/null | head -1)}"
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MEG_CONTAINER="${MEG_CONTAINER:-meg}"
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acceptance_checklist() {
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local fails=0
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# Gate 2: pinned version, never latest.
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local img
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img=$(docker inspect --format '{{.Config.Image}}' "$MEG_CONTAINER" 2>/dev/null || echo "")
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if [[ -z "$img" ]]; then echo "CHECK container-running: SKIP (no container $MEG_CONTAINER yet)"; else echo "CHECK container-running: PASS ($img)"; fi
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if [[ "$img" == *":latest" ]]; then echo "CHECK pinned-tag: FAIL (latest forbidden)"; fails=$((fails+1)); else echo "CHECK pinned-tag: PASS"; fi
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# Gate 4: restart policy unless-stopped.
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if [[ -n "$img" ]]; then
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local pol
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pol=$(docker inspect --format '{{.HostConfig.RestartPolicy.Name}}' "$MEG_CONTAINER" 2>/dev/null)
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[[ "$pol" == "unless-stopped" ]] && echo "CHECK restart-policy: PASS" || { echo "CHECK restart-policy: FAIL ($pol)"; fails=$((fails+1)); }
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fi
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# Gate 5: no 0.0.0.0 port bind to the outside.
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if ss -tlnp 2>/dev/null | grep -q "0.0.0.0"; then echo "CHECK port-bind: WARN (external bind present — review)"; else echo "CHECK port-bind: PASS"; fi
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return "$fails"
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}
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if [[ "$CHECK_MODE" -eq 1 ]]; then
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if [[ -z "${MEG_DEB:-}" || ! -f "$MEG_DEB" ]] && ! dpkg -s meg >/dev/null 2>&1 && ! docker ps --format '{{.Names}}' 2>/dev/null | grep -qx "$MEG_CONTAINER"; then
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log "OK(check): MEG not supplied yet (SKIP state)"
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exit 0
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fi
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acceptance_checklist || { log "FAIL(check): MEG acceptance checklist failed"; exit 1; }
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log "OK(check): MEG acceptance checklist passed"
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exit 0
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fi
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if [[ "${MEG_SKIP:-0}" == "1" ]]; then log "SKIP: MEG_SKIP=1"; exit 3; fi
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if ! dpkg -s meg >/dev/null 2>&1 && ! docker ps -a --format '{{.Names}}' 2>/dev/null | grep -qx "$MEG_CONTAINER"; then
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if [[ -n "${MEG_DEB:-}" && -f "$MEG_DEB" ]]; then
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export DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
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dpkg -i "$MEG_DEB" || apt-get install -f -y
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log "MEG package installed from $MEG_DEB"
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else
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log "SKIP: no MEG .deb supplied — vendor package pending, continuing"
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exit 3
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fi
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else
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log "MEG already present, keeping"
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fi
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if ! acceptance_checklist; then
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log "FAIL: MEG acceptance checklist failed — see output above"
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exit 1
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fi
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log "OK: MEG present and acceptance checklist passed"
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