ef102b9657
Adds the Blueforce Field OS provisioning stack on top of the existing fleet architecture, without rewriting the working systems (installer, diagnostics, Ansible, WireGuard/SSH/xRDP/RustDesk, Docker policies, monitoring, Docusaurus). ISO build (the previous builder was a skeleton that produced no medium): - boot layout is read from the base ISO at build time via `xorriso -report_el_torito as_mkisofs` and rebuilt with `-as mkisofs`; `-boot_image any replay` cannot work on Ubuntu live ISOs because the GRUB2 MBR lives in the source image's first 16 sectors and the EFI system partition is an appended partition, neither of which is a file in the ISO9660 tree - preflight now asserts El Torito boot metadata positively: xorriso exits 0 on a non-ISO input, which previously let an arbitrary file pass --check - artifact produced and verified: dist/Blueforce-Field-OS-1.0.0-amd64.iso, 6 481 917 952 bytes, SHA256 cb0cc56f...d431296, BIOS+UEFI entries preserved, /autoinstall.yaml at the media root, casper/minimal.squashfs byte-identical to the base - recorded baseline deviation: the verified medium on the build host is the Desktop flavour, so the manifest carries a baseline_deviation block instead of hiding it; Server remains one flag away Offline and identity: - offline APT contract with concrete package requirements, pin format and an audit table; builds fail closed while pins are UNPINNED - autoinstall keeps interactive-sections: [storage]: the operator confirms the target disk, and no automatic wipe is ever performed - firstboot terminal wizard for the 8-digit dealer id, three-state lifecycle (PROVISIONED_OFFLINE -> ENROLLED -> READY) with fail-closed gates, so a missing internet link or WireGuard handshake cannot fail provisioning but can never produce a false READY Fleet and migration: - five read-only Ansible playbooks for Field OS version, provisioning, enrollment, remote channels and offline readiness, all wave-scoped with a separate production override - Windows pre-migration inventory and data export extended to the full brief scope, read-only, never collecting credentials Tests: tests/run-all.sh -> 8/8 pass, exit 0. Boot acceptance (UEFI, Legacy BIOS, Secure Boot), air-gapped install, real enrollment endpoint and Windows rollback remain LAB work and are listed in IMPLEMENTATION-REPORT.md.
23 lines
764 B
Text
23 lines
764 B
Text
# Purpose: Harden field-device SSH to key-only maintenance access.
|
|
# Scope: Applies to the blueforce user; root and password logins stay disabled.
|
|
# Safety: Drop-in for sshd_config.d; validate with sshd -t before reload.
|
|
# Ref: docs/06-USERS-SSH-AND-PERMISSIONS.md, K-13.
|
|
|
|
# No direct root login; privilege is gained only via audited sudo.
|
|
PermitRootLogin no
|
|
|
|
# Key-only auth: passwords and interactive challenges are disabled.
|
|
PasswordAuthentication no
|
|
ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
|
|
KbdInteractiveAuthentication no
|
|
PubkeyAuthentication yes
|
|
|
|
# Only the maintenance user may open SSH sessions.
|
|
AllowUsers blueforce
|
|
|
|
# Reduce idle-session and brute-force exposure.
|
|
X11Forwarding no
|
|
MaxAuthTries 3
|
|
LoginGraceTime 60
|
|
ClientAliveInterval 300
|
|
ClientAliveCountMax 2
|