ef102b9657
Adds the Blueforce Field OS provisioning stack on top of the existing fleet architecture, without rewriting the working systems (installer, diagnostics, Ansible, WireGuard/SSH/xRDP/RustDesk, Docker policies, monitoring, Docusaurus). ISO build (the previous builder was a skeleton that produced no medium): - boot layout is read from the base ISO at build time via `xorriso -report_el_torito as_mkisofs` and rebuilt with `-as mkisofs`; `-boot_image any replay` cannot work on Ubuntu live ISOs because the GRUB2 MBR lives in the source image's first 16 sectors and the EFI system partition is an appended partition, neither of which is a file in the ISO9660 tree - preflight now asserts El Torito boot metadata positively: xorriso exits 0 on a non-ISO input, which previously let an arbitrary file pass --check - artifact produced and verified: dist/Blueforce-Field-OS-1.0.0-amd64.iso, 6 481 917 952 bytes, SHA256 cb0cc56f...d431296, BIOS+UEFI entries preserved, /autoinstall.yaml at the media root, casper/minimal.squashfs byte-identical to the base - recorded baseline deviation: the verified medium on the build host is the Desktop flavour, so the manifest carries a baseline_deviation block instead of hiding it; Server remains one flag away Offline and identity: - offline APT contract with concrete package requirements, pin format and an audit table; builds fail closed while pins are UNPINNED - autoinstall keeps interactive-sections: [storage]: the operator confirms the target disk, and no automatic wipe is ever performed - firstboot terminal wizard for the 8-digit dealer id, three-state lifecycle (PROVISIONED_OFFLINE -> ENROLLED -> READY) with fail-closed gates, so a missing internet link or WireGuard handshake cannot fail provisioning but can never produce a false READY Fleet and migration: - five read-only Ansible playbooks for Field OS version, provisioning, enrollment, remote channels and offline readiness, all wave-scoped with a separate production override - Windows pre-migration inventory and data export extended to the full brief scope, read-only, never collecting credentials Tests: tests/run-all.sh -> 8/8 pass, exit 0. Boot acceptance (UEFI, Legacy BIOS, Secure Boot), air-gapped install, real enrollment endpoint and Windows rollback remain LAB work and are listed in IMPLEMENTATION-REPORT.md.
57 lines
2.7 KiB
Bash
Executable file
57 lines
2.7 KiB
Bash
Executable file
#!/usr/bin/env bash
|
|
# Apply Blueforce's reviewed Docker published-port policy to DOCKER-USER.
|
|
set -euo pipefail
|
|
|
|
ALLOWLIST="${DOCKER_ALLOWLIST:-/etc/blueforce/docker-published-port-allowlist.conf}"
|
|
CHECK_MODE=0
|
|
[[ "${1:-}" == "--check" ]] && CHECK_MODE=1
|
|
|
|
fail() { printf 'blueforce-docker-firewall: %s\n' "$*" >&2; exit 1; }
|
|
parse_allowlist() {
|
|
local callback="$1" raw line protocol port extra
|
|
[[ -r "$ALLOWLIST" ]] || fail "allowlist is missing or unreadable: $ALLOWLIST"
|
|
while IFS= read -r raw || [[ -n "$raw" ]]; do
|
|
line="${raw%%#*}"
|
|
line="$(printf '%s' "$line" | xargs)"
|
|
[[ -z "$line" ]] && continue
|
|
read -r protocol port extra <<< "$line"
|
|
[[ -z "${extra:-}" && "$protocol" =~ ^(tcp|udp)$ && "$port" =~ ^[0-9]{1,5}$ ]] || fail "invalid allowlist entry '$raw'; use 'tcp PORT' or 'udp PORT'"
|
|
((10#$port >= 1 && 10#$port <= 65535)) || fail "port out of range in '$raw'"
|
|
"$callback" "$protocol" "$port"
|
|
done < "$ALLOWLIST"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
validate_allowlist() { parse_allowlist :; }
|
|
install_allow_rule() {
|
|
local protocol="$1" port="$2"
|
|
# Docker DNAT precedes DOCKER-USER; match the original reviewed published port.
|
|
iptables -I DOCKER-USER -p "$protocol" -m conntrack --ctorigdstport "$port" -j ACCEPT
|
|
}
|
|
verify_allow_rule() {
|
|
local protocol="$1" port="$2"
|
|
iptables -C DOCKER-USER -p "$protocol" -m conntrack --ctorigdstport "$port" -j ACCEPT || fail "allowlist rule missing: $protocol $port"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
validate_allowlist
|
|
command -v iptables >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "iptables is required"
|
|
iptables -S DOCKER-USER >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "DOCKER-USER chain is unavailable; start Docker first"
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$CHECK_MODE" -eq 1 ]]; then
|
|
iptables -C DOCKER-USER -m conntrack --ctstate RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT || fail "established/related rule missing"
|
|
iptables -C DOCKER-USER -i docker0 -j RETURN || fail "docker0 outbound return rule missing"
|
|
iptables -C DOCKER-USER -i br+ -j RETURN || fail "user-defined bridge outbound return rule missing"
|
|
parse_allowlist verify_allow_rule
|
|
iptables -C DOCKER-USER -j DROP || fail "default published-port deny rule missing"
|
|
exit 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Blueforce owns DOCKER-USER so an old permissive rule cannot bypass the deny.
|
|
iptables -F DOCKER-USER
|
|
iptables -A DOCKER-USER -m conntrack --ctstate RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
|
|
# Container-to-Internet packets enter FORWARD from Docker bridges; inbound published-port
|
|
# packets enter from an external interface, so these returns do not bypass the deny below.
|
|
iptables -A DOCKER-USER -i docker0 -j RETURN
|
|
iptables -A DOCKER-USER -i br+ -j RETURN
|
|
# Insert every parsed allowlist exception before the final default drop.
|
|
parse_allowlist install_allow_rule
|
|
iptables -A DOCKER-USER -j DROP
|