Adds the Blueforce Field OS provisioning stack on top of the existing fleet architecture, without rewriting the working systems (installer, diagnostics, Ansible, WireGuard/SSH/xRDP/RustDesk, Docker policies, monitoring, Docusaurus). ISO build (the previous builder was a skeleton that produced no medium): - boot layout is read from the base ISO at build time via `xorriso -report_el_torito as_mkisofs` and rebuilt with `-as mkisofs`; `-boot_image any replay` cannot work on Ubuntu live ISOs because the GRUB2 MBR lives in the source image's first 16 sectors and the EFI system partition is an appended partition, neither of which is a file in the ISO9660 tree - preflight now asserts El Torito boot metadata positively: xorriso exits 0 on a non-ISO input, which previously let an arbitrary file pass --check - artifact produced and verified: dist/Blueforce-Field-OS-1.0.0-amd64.iso, 6 481 917 952 bytes, SHA256 cb0cc56f...d431296, BIOS+UEFI entries preserved, /autoinstall.yaml at the media root, casper/minimal.squashfs byte-identical to the base - recorded baseline deviation: the verified medium on the build host is the Desktop flavour, so the manifest carries a baseline_deviation block instead of hiding it; Server remains one flag away Offline and identity: - offline APT contract with concrete package requirements, pin format and an audit table; builds fail closed while pins are UNPINNED - autoinstall keeps interactive-sections: [storage]: the operator confirms the target disk, and no automatic wipe is ever performed - firstboot terminal wizard for the 8-digit dealer id, three-state lifecycle (PROVISIONED_OFFLINE -> ENROLLED -> READY) with fail-closed gates, so a missing internet link or WireGuard handshake cannot fail provisioning but can never produce a false READY Fleet and migration: - five read-only Ansible playbooks for Field OS version, provisioning, enrollment, remote channels and offline readiness, all wave-scoped with a separate production override - Windows pre-migration inventory and data export extended to the full brief scope, read-only, never collecting credentials Tests: tests/run-all.sh -> 8/8 pass, exit 0. Boot acceptance (UEFI, Legacy BIOS, Secure Boot), air-gapped install, real enrollment endpoint and Windows rollback remain LAB work and are listed in IMPLEMENTATION-REPORT.md.
54 lines
2.3 KiB
YAML
54 lines
2.3 KiB
YAML
# Fleet alert rules. Severity: critical pages the on-call admin (14-MONITORING).
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# Notification endpoints (SMS/e-mail/webhook) are wired in the central
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# Grafana Alerting / Alertmanager setup, not in this file.
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# All expressions assume 60s scrape interval.
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groups:
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- name: fleet
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interval: 60s
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rules:
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# Device does not answer scrapes for 5 minutes -> presumed offline.
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- alert: FleetOffline
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expr: up{job="node"} == 0
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for: 5m
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labels:
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severity: critical
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annotations:
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summary: "Device {{ $labels.device_id }} is offline"
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description: "No successful scrape for 5m (instance {{ $labels.instance }}). Check Uptime Kuma last-seen and field power/network."
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# Root filesystem less than 10% available for 10 minutes.
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- alert: FleetDiskFull
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expr: |
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(
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node_filesystem_avail_bytes{job="node", mountpoint="/", fstype!~"tmpfs|overlay"}
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/
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node_filesystem_size_bytes{job="node", mountpoint="/", fstype!~"tmpfs|overlay"}
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) < 0.10
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for: 10m
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labels:
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severity: critical
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annotations:
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summary: "Device {{ $labels.device_id }} disk almost full"
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description: "Root filesystem <10% available for 10m on {{ $labels.instance }}."
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# Boot time changed recently -> unexpected reboot (power loss or crash).
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- alert: FleetUnexpectedReboot
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expr: time() - node_boot_time_seconds{job="node"} < 15 * 60
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for: 5m
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labels:
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severity: critical
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annotations:
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summary: "Device {{ $labels.device_id }} rebooted unexpectedly"
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description: "{{ $labels.instance }} booted less than 15m ago. Correlate with power-loss recovery (16-POWER-LOSS)."
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# unattended-upgrades must stay DISABLED (K-11); 1 means the lock was broken.
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# Source: textfile metric unattended_upgrade_active.
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- alert: FleetSecurityUpdatesViolation
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expr: unattended_upgrade_active{job="node"} == 1
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for: 5m
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labels:
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severity: critical
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annotations:
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summary: "Device {{ $labels.device_id }} has unattended-upgrades enabled"
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description: "Update policy lock (K-11) violated on {{ $labels.instance }}. Disable unattended-upgrades per 10-UPDATE."
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